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Abstract
This paper studies the throughput of large-scale decentralized wireless networks with physical layer
security constraints. In particular, we are interested in the question of how much throughput needs to be
sacrificed for achieving a certain level of security. We consider random networks where the legitimate nodes
and the eavesdroppers are distributed according to independent two-dimensional Poisson point processes. The
transmission capacity framework is used to characterize the area spectral efficiency of secure transmissions
with constraints on both the quality of service (QoS) and the level of security. This framework illustrates the
dependence of the network throughput on key system parameters, such as the densities of legitimate nodes
and eavesdroppers, as well as the QoS and security constraints. One important finding is that the throughput
cost of achieving a moderate level of security is quite low, while throughput must be significantly sacrificed
to realize a highly secure network. We also study the use of a secrecy guard zone, which is shown to give
a significant improvement on the throughput of networks with high security requirements.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, decentralized wireless networks, transmission capacity, guard zone.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of securing wireless communications at the physical layer has recently drawn
considerable attention. In the pioneering works on physical layer security, Wyner [1] introduced
X. Zhou and A. Hjørungnes are with UNIK - University Graduate Center, University of Oslo, Kjeller, NO-2027, Norway. (Email:
{xiangyun,arehj}@unik.no). R. K. Ganti and J. G. Andrews are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, the
University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, USA. (Emails: rganti@austin.utexas.edu, jandrews@ece.utexas.edu). This work
was supported by the Research Council of Norway through the project 197565/V30, and the DARPA IT-MANET project. Manuscript
date: October 16, 2018.
ar
X
iv
:1
01
2.
45
52
v3
  [
cs
.IT
]  
6 J
un
 20
11
2the wiretap channel for single point-to-point communication, which was extended to broadcast
channels with both common and confidential messages by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2]. Their results
showed that perfect secrecy can be achieved if the intended receiver has a stronger channel than
the eavesdropper. Recent studies on physical layer security primarily focused on communications
involving a small number of nodes with multi-antenna transmission [3–5], cooperative transmission
in relay channels [6, 7] or multiple access channels [8, 9]. However, few studies have been carried out
for large-scale wireless networks. Unlike point-to-point communications, where it is reasonably easy
to establish secret keys and have encrypted transmissions, security is more expensive and difficult to
achieve in large-scale decentralized networks. Therefore, physical layer security may be important
for exchanging secret keys and adding another layer of protection in such networks.
The communication between any pair of nodes in large-scale networks strongly depends on the
locations of other nodes and how the nodes interact with each other. When secure communication
is required in the presence of eavesdroppers, the locations and channel state information of the
eavesdroppers, which are usually unknown, become extra parameters affecting the network through-
put. Initial works on network security from an information-theoretic viewpoint mainly considered
networks where the legitimate nodes and the eavesdroppers are randomly distributed, and studied
the connectivity [10–14], coverage [15], and capacity scaling laws [16–18]. Specifically, various
statistical characterizations of the existence of secure connections were given in [10–12, 14]. Using
tools from percolation theory, the existence of a secrecy graph was analyzed in [10, 12, 13]. These
connectivity results are concerned with the possibility of having secure communication, while they do
not give insight on the network throughput. The authors in [16–18] derived secrecy capacity scaling
laws in static and mobile ad hoc networks, i.e., the order-of-growth of the secrecy capacity as the
number of nodes increases. Although the scaling laws may provide insights into the information-
theoretic performance of large-scale networks, a finer view of throughput is necessary to better
understand the impact of key system parameters and transmission protocols, since most of these
design choices affect the throughput but not the scaling behaviors [19].
A. Approach and Contributions
In this work, we aim to characterize the throughput of secure communications in large wireless
networks and to understand how the security requirements affect the network throughput. Our
approach uses a metric termed the transmission capacity [20], which provides the area spectral
efficiency (ASE) of decentralized networks with random topology, identical nodes, and a constraint
3on outage probability. A tutorial on transmission capacity can be found in [21], which showed how
analytical results can often be derived in simple forms. We extend this capacity framework to study
the impact of physical layer security requirements on the network ASE.
The networks considered have both legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers, whose locations follow
homogeneous Poisson point processes (PPPs). We define the secrecy transmission capacity as the
achievable rate of successful transmission of confidential messages per unit area for given constraints
on the quality of service (QoS) and the level of security. The QoS constraint is given by the outage
probability of the transmission between a legitimate transmitter-receiver pair, while the security
constraint is given by the probability of a transmission failing to achieve perfect secrecy. The secrecy
transmission capacity shows the dependence of the network ASE on the key system parameters,
i.e., the densities of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers, as well as the QoS and security constraints.
To illustrate the use of the general capacity formulation, we derive an accurate closed-form lower
bound on the secrecy transmission capacity for Rayleigh fading channels. This simple capacity bound
gives a quantitative characterization of the throughput cost of physical layer security. Specifically,
the throughput reduction for achieving a moderate level of security is relatively small, while a
significant amount of throughput needs to be sacrificed to realize a highly secure network. We also
give a condition for the existence of positive secrecy transmission capacity. It turns out that the
QoS and security constraints as well as the density of eavesdroppers are crucial in determining the
existence of positive secrecy transmission capacity.
In order to minimize the throughput cost of achieving high network security, it is worthwhile to
consider transmission protocols that are robust against eavesdropping and can be implemented in a
decentralized manner. Since insecure transmission is mainly due to the presence of an eavesdropper
close to the transmitter, we consider the use of a secrecy guard zone for networks in which the
legitimate transmitters are able to detect the existence of eavesdroppers in their vicinities [11, 16].1
Transmission of confidential messages take place only if no eavesdroppers are found inside the guard
zone of the corresponding transmitter. We consider two transmission protocols when eavesdropper(s)
are found inside the guard zone, i.e., the transmitter either remains silent or produces artificial noise to
help the other transmitters. The secrecy transmission capacity is studied for both protocols. Numerical
results show that a significant throughput improvement can be achieved from the use of a guard
1The application of secrecy guard zone is not always possible. It is applicable in the scenarios where, for example, the legitimate
transmitters are able to physically inspect their surrounding areas [11].
4zone for networks with high security requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the system model and the
secrecy transmission capacity formulation. In Section III, we obtain analytical results on the secrecy
transmission capacity in Rayleigh fading channels. In Section IV, we investigate the secrecy guard
zone with two different transmission protocols. Numerical results are presented in Section V and
concluding remarks in Section VI. A summary of the notation used in this paper is given in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CAPACITY FORMULATION
We consider an ad hoc network consisting of both legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers over a
large two-dimensional space. For each snapshot in time, we have a set of legitimate transmitter
locations, denoted by Φl.2 Each transmitter has a unique associated intended receiver. The set of
receivers is disjoint with the set of transmitters. In addition, we have a set of eavesdropper locations
in each snapshot, denoted by Φe. We model Φl and Φe as independent homogeneous PPPs with
densities λl and λe, respectively. This is a suitable model for decentralized networks with nodes
having substantial mobility [21]. Note that the eavesdroppers need to have similar mobility and other
behaviors as the legitimate nodes since they can be easily identified otherwise [17]. Furthermore,
we assume that the eavesdroppers do not collude with each other and, hence, must decode the
confidential messages individually. An example of a network snapshot is shown in Fig. 1.
Consider only one active transmitter that wants to send confidential messages to its intended
receiver in the presence of the eavesdroppers. Secure encoding schemes, such as the Wyner code [1],
were found in point-to-point systems with the notion of weak secrecy. The notion of strong secrecy
and the corresponding encoding scheme were studied in [22]. According to Wyner’s encoding
scheme, the transmitter chooses two rates, namely, the rate of the transmitted codewords Rt and the
rate of the confidential messages Rs. The rate difference Re = Rt−Rs reflects the cost of securing
the messages against eavesdropping. If Rt is less than the mutual information between the channel
input and output of the legitimate link, the receiver is able to decode the message with an arbitrarily
small error. At the same time, if Re is larger than the mutual information between the channel
input and output of every eavesdropper link (i.e., links from the transmitter to every eavesdropper),
perfect secrecy is achieved as the mutual information between the confidential message and every
2For networks employing a slotted Aloha protocol, Φl can be viewed as the locations of the actual transmitters (out of all potential
transmitters) in each time slot.
5eavesdropper’s received signal approaches zero ratewise. The detailed description of the Wyner code
can be found in [1, 23, 24].
In an ad hoc network with simultaneous transmissions from infinitely many legitimate transmitters,
it is difficult to study the mutual information between any pair of nodes. To make the design and
analysis mathematically tractable, we assume that the transmitted signal (i.e., channel input) has a
Gaussian distribution and both the intended receivers and the eavesdroppers treat the interference
from concurrent transmissions as noise. In addition, we assume that the network is interference-
limited, hence, the receiver noise is negligible. With these assumptions, the mutual information or
capacity of either a legitimate link or an eavesdropper link is now determined by the instantaneous
signal to interference ratio (SIR). For any given choices of Rt and Rs in Wyner’s encoding scheme,
the following outage events can result from any transmission [24]:
• Connection Outage: The capacity of the channel from the transmitter to the intended receiver
is below the transmission rate Rt. Hence, the message cannot be correctly decoded by the
intended receiver. The probability of this event happening is referred to as the connection
outage probability, denoted as Pco.
• Secrecy Outage: The capacity of the channel from the transmitter to one or more eavesdroppers
is above the rate Re. Hence, the message is not perfectly secure against eavesdropping. The
probability of this event happening is referred to as the secrecy outage probability, denoted as
Pso.
The connection outage probability can be regarded as the communication QoS while the secrecy
outage probability gives a measure of the security level.
The primary goal of this work is to characterize the throughput of secure transmissions in
decentralized wireless networks. Although it is extremely difficult to find the network capacity region,
the idea of transmission capacity proposed in [20] often gives useful insights on the network ASE and
the impacts of the key system parameters. Building on the existing transmission capacity framework,
we define the secrecy transmission capacity as the achievable rate of successful transmission of
confidential messages per unit area, for a given connection outage constraint and a given secrecy
outage constraint. Mathematically, the secrecy transmission capacity, with a connection outage
probability of Pco = σ and a secrecy outage probability of Pso = , is defined as
τ = R¯s(1− σ)λl, (1)
where R¯s is the average rate of confidential messages. In this work, we focus on a simple scenario
6where the transmit power and the distances to the intended receivers have fixed values which are
the same for all transmitters. Therefore, the confidential message rates also take the same values
for all transmitters. Denote the distance between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs as r, the
secrecy transmission capacity can be written as
τ(r) = Rs(1− σ)λl. (2)
The connection outage constraint σ determines the value of Rt, while the secrecy outage constraint
 determines the value of Re. Therefore, the rate of confidential messages Rs in (2), given by
Rt − Re, is a function of σ and . With these choices of rates for the Wyner code, the probability
that a message transmission can be successfully decoded by the intended receiver is 1 − σ, while
the probability that a message transmission is perfectly secure against eavesdropping is 1− , under
the assumption of treating interference as noise.
If we allow the distance between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair varies over time and/or
space but follows some known distribution f(r), the secrecy transmission capacity is computed as
τ =
∫
τ(r)f(r)dr. (3)
In practice, the distribution of r depends on specific scenarios. Hence, we do not consider the
variation in r and focus on τ(r) in (2).
III. SECRECY TRANSMISSION CAPACITY IN RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we derive analytical results on the secrecy transmission capacity for Rayleigh
fading channels. We assume that each node has a single antenna for transmission or reception, and
the fading channel states are known at the receiver side (including the eavesdroppers) but not at
the transmitter side. The derivation of the secrecy transmission capacity involves two main steps: 1)
Use the connection outage constraint σ to find the value of Rt. 2) Use the secrecy outage constraint
 to find the value of Re.
Our analysis is based on an arbitrarily chosen transmitter-receiver pair, which are named the
typical transmitter and receiver. For confidential message transmission from the typical transmitter,
the other transmitters act as interferers to the typical receiver or any eavesdropper. From Slivnyak’s
Theorem [25], the spatial distribution of the interferers, given the location of the typical transmitter,
still follows a homogeneous PPP with density λl. By slight abuse of notation (since we have used
Φl to denote the set of all transmitter locations), we will also refer to Φl as the set of interferer
locations in the rest of this paper.
7For the typical receiver, a connection outage occurs if log2(1 + SIR0) < Rt, where SIR0 denotes
the SIR at the typical receiver given by
SIR0 =
S0r
−α∑
l∈Φl Sl|Xl|−α
, (4)
where S0 and r are the channel fading gain and the distance between the typical transmitter and
receiver, respectively, α is the path loss exponent, Sl and |Xl| are the channel fading gain and the
distance between the interferer (at position) l in Φl and the typical receiver, respectively. We assume
α > 2 throughout this paper. The fading gains are modeled as independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) exponential random variables with unit mean.
Define a threshold SIR value for connection outage as
βt = 2
Rt − 1. (5)
Hence, the connection outage probability can be written as
Pco = P
(
SIR0 < βt
)
= P
(
S0r
−α∑
l∈Φl Sl|Xl|−α
< βt
)
. (6)
The summation term
∑
l∈Φl Sl|Xl|−α is a shot noise process [26] in two-dimensional space whose
Laplace transform is known in a closed form and was used to compute the connection outage
probability in [27] as
Pco = 1− exp
[
−λlpir2β2/αt Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]
. (7)
With the connection outage constraint given by Pco = σ, the transmission rate Rt can be found
using (5) and (7) as
Rt = log2
1 + [ ln 11−σ
λlpir2Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)]α2
 . (8)
It is clear that a lower connection outage probability (i.e., a higher QoS) requires a lower Rt.
On the other hand, the confidential message transmission is not perfectly secure against the
eavesdropper (at position) e in Φe if log2(1 + SIRe) > Re, where SIRe denotes the SIR at e given
by
SIRe =
Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
, (9)
where Se and |Xe| are the channel fading gain and the distance between the typical transmitter
and eavesdropper e in Φe, respectively, Sle and |Xle| are the channel fading gain and the distance
8between node l in Φl and eavesdropper e in Φe, respectively. The fading gains are modeled as i.i.d.
exponential random variables with unit mean.
Define a threshold SIR value for secrecy outage as
βe = 2
Re − 1. (10)
Let A = {y ∈ Φe : SIRy > βe}, i.e., the set of eavesdroppers that can cause secrecy outage. Hence,
we can define the following indicator function: 1A(e), which equals 1 when the eavesdropper e is in
the set A. The secrecy outage probability equals the probability that at least one of the eavesdroppers
in Φe causes a secrecy outage, which can be written as
Pso = 1− EΦl
{
EΦe
{
ES
{ ∏
e∈Φe
(
1− 1A(e)
)}}}
,
= 1− EΦl
{
EΦe
{ ∏
e∈Φe
(
1− P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
∣∣∣Φe,Φl))}}. (11)
where the independence in the fading gains among different eavesdroppers is used to move the
expectation over S = {Se, Sle} inside the product over Φe in (11). Since it is difficult to express
Pso in a closed form, we look for analytical bounds on the secrecy outage probability. The results
are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The secrecy outage probability is bounded from above by
PUBso = 1− exp
− λe
λlβ
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
 , (12)
and bounded from below by
PLBso =
1
1 + λl
λe
β
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
) . (13)
Proof: Using the generating functional of the PPP Φe [25], we can express the secrecy outage
probability in (11) as
Pso = 1− EΦl
{
exp
[
− λe
∫
R2
P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
∣∣∣Φl)de]}. (14)
Jensen’s inequality gives an upper bound on Pso
Pso ≤ 1− exp
[
− λe
∫
R2
P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
)
de
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2piλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−λlpir2eβ2/αe Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]
redre
]
, (15)
9where re denotes the distance between the typical transmitter and eavesdropper e, (15) is arrived in
the same way as (7) followed by changing to polar coordinates. The upper bound in (12) is then
obtained by directly evaluating the integration in (15).
The lower bound on Pso is obtained by considering only the eavesdropper nearest to the typical
transmitter. Denote the eavesdropper (location) in Φe that is nearest to the typical transmitter as e′
and denote the distance between e′ and the typical transmitter as re′ . The probability distribution of
re′ is given by [28]
f(re′) = 2λepire′ exp(−λepir2e′). (16)
The secrecy outage probability is bounded from below by the probability that the nearest eaves-
dropper causes a secrecy outage, i.e.,
Pso ≥
∫ ∞
0
P
( Se′r−αe′∑
l∈Φl Sle′|Xle′|−α
> βe
)
f(re′)dre′
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−λlpir2e′β2/αe Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]
2λepire′ exp(−λepir2e′)dre′ . (17)
The lower bound in (13) is then obtained by directly evaluating the integration in (17). 
Note that the authors in [29] used the same bounding techniques to derive analytical bounds on
the probability of connectivity in a different network scenario and numerically studied the accuracy
of the derived bounds. From the numerical illustration in [29, Fig. 5], we know that the upper bound
PUBso in (12) gives accurate approximation of the exact secrecy outage probability over the entire
range of Pso ∈ [0, 1], while the lower bound PLBso in (13) is usually very different from the exact
value of Pso. Moreover, both PUBso and P
LB
so are asymptotically tight in the low probability regime.
To see this, we consider PUBso ≈ 0 and PLBso ≈ 0, in which case the bounds in (12) and (13) can be
approximated by
PUBso ≈
λe
λlβ
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
) ≈ PLBso . (18)
Hence, both PUBso and P
LB
so approach the exact value of Pso in the low probability regime.
Recall that the goal here is to determine the value of Re from the secrecy outage constraint of
Pso = . Using the upper bound on the secrecy outage probability in (12), the value of Re that
guarantees the required security level can be found as
Re = log2
(
1 +
[λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)
ln
1
1− 
]−α
2
)
. (19)
It is clear that a lower secrecy outage probability (i.e., a higher security level) requires a higher Re.
10
Having Rt in (8) and Re in (19), a lower bound on the secrecy transmission capacity is obtained
as τLB(r) = (Rt −Re)(1− σ)λl. Its expression is presented in the following theorem:
Theorem 1: A lower bound on the secrecy transmission capacity with a connection outage con-
straint of σ and a secrecy outage constraint of  is given by
τLB(r) = (1− σ)λl log2
 1 +
[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α )
]α
2
1 +
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
]−α
2
 . (20)
From our discussion on the accuracy of PUBso , we know that the lower bound on the secrecy
transmission capacity in (20) is generally accurate for any values of σ and , and is asymptotically
tight as → 0. Therefore, we will for simplicity refer to τLB(r) in (20) as the secrecy transmission
capacity in the rest of this paper. It is clear from (20) that τLB(r) reduces as  decreases. The
reduction in τLB(r) as  decreases can be viewed as the throughput cost of improving physical layer
security.
In practical network design, the connection outage constraint and the spatial transmission intensity3
may be under the control of the system designer. The derived closed-form characterization of the
secrecy transmission capacity allows the designer to optimize these system parameters to maximize
the throughput of secure transmissions with a target security level.
A. Existence of Positive Secrecy Transmission Capacity
A fundamental question to ask is the condition under which positive secrecy transmission capacity
exists. From the expression in (20), one can find this condition by solving τLB(r) > 0.
Corollary 1: The condition for positive secrecy transmission capacity is given by
ln
1
1− σ ln
1
1−  > pir
2λe. (21)
In other words, positive secrecy transmission capacity is achieved if the average number of eaves-
droppers within a distance r from the transmitter (i.e., having shorter distances than the intended
receiver) is less than ln 1
1−σ ln
1
1− .
Remark 1: The condition in (21) clearly gives a trade-off between the QoS and the security level
of a network: The QoS needs to be compromised (i.e., allowing a larger value of σ) in order to
3In networks employing an Aloha protocol, the spatial transmission intensity equals the density of potential transmitters multiplied
by the probability of transmission. In this case, the system designer may control the probability of transmission to vary the spatial
transmission intensity.
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achieve a higher security level (i.e., a smaller value of ). Therefore, a moderate connection outage
probability is usually desirable for highly secure networks. Furthermore, the feasible range of σ can
be found from (21) as
σ ∈
(
1− exp
[
−pir
2λe
ln 1
1−
]
, 1
)
. (22)
Remark 2: The condition in (21) does not depend on the spatial transmission intensity λl. That is
to say, positive secrecy transmission capacity cannot be achieved simply by bringing in additional
legitimate users or deactivating existing legitimate users, if the connection outage and secrecy outage
performances of the network do not meet the condition in (21). Once this condition is met and the
network is operating with some positive secrecy transmission capacity, there exists an optimal value
of λl which can be found numerically using (20). To obtain some analytical insights into the optimal
λl, we consider the low secrecy transmission capacity regime by letting ln 11−σ ln
1
1− ≈ pir2λe which
implies τLB(r) ≈ 0. We rewrite (20) as
τLB(r) = (1− σ)λl log2
1 +
[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α )
]α
2 −
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
]−α
2
1 +
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
]−α
2

≈ (1− σ)λl
ln 2
[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α )
]α
2 −
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
]−α
2
1 +
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
]−α
2
=
1− σ
ln 2
[
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]−α
2
( ln 11−σ
pir2
)α
2
−
(
ln 1
1−
λe
)−α
2

× 1
λ
α
2
−1
l +
[
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
λe
]−α
2
λ−1l
. (23)
Assuming τLB(r) in (23) is positive, the optimal value of λl that maximizes τLB(r) is given by
λoptl =
( 2
α− 2
) 2
α λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
. (24)
From (24), we see that the optimal spatial transmission intensity increases as the required security
level increases (i.e., as  decreases). In addition, the optimal spatial transmission intensity is usually
much higher than the density of eavesdroppers for highly secure networks. For example, λoptl /λe ≈
63 for  = 0.01 and α = 4. Although these observations are made in the regime of arbitrarily low
secrecy transmission capacity, as we will see in Section V, they are also valid for more general
scenarios.
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B. Optimal Connection Outage Probability in Sparse Networks
When the system designer has control over the connection outage constraint, the expression of
secrecy transmission capacity in (20) can be used to numerically find the value of σ that maximizes
τLB(r). Here, we present a closed-form solution of the optimal connection outage probability in
sparse networks, i.e.,λlpir2  1. Note that our analysis is based on the assumption of interference-
limited networks, which is valid if the transmit power of the legitimate users is sufficiently high
such that the receiver noise is much weaker than the aggregate interference.
From the discussion in Subsection III-A, we know that the value of σ should not be chosen very
close to 0. When the network is sparse, i.e.,λlpir2  1, the secrecy transmission capacity in (20)
can be approximated as
τLB(r) ≈ (1− σ)λl log2

[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α )
]α
2
1 +
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
]−α
2
 (25)
= (1− σ)λl log2
([
κ ln
1
1− σ
]α
2
)
, (26)
where we have assumed in (25) that the path loss exponent α is not close to 2 (which happens in
most outdoor scenarios) and the connection outage probability is not close to 0, and
κ =
(
1 +
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
ln 1
1−
]−α
2
)− 2
α
λlpir2Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
) . (27)
The optimal connection outage probability that maximizes the secrecy transmission capacity in
(26) is given by
σopt = 1− 1
exp
[
1
W0(κ)
] , (28)
where W0(·) is the real-valued principal branch of Lambert’s W function. This result is obtained
by directly taking the derivative of τLB(r) in (26) w.r.t.σ and solving for the root. Furthermore,
one can show that the optimal connection outage probability increases when a higher security level
(i.e., a lower ) is required.
IV. SECRECY GUARD ZONE
In this section, we consider simple protocols for improving the secrecy transmission capacity.
We assume that the legitimate transmitters are able to detect the existence of eavesdroppers within
13
a finite range. We model this range as a disk with radius D centered at each transmitter and call
it the secrecy guard zone. Transmission of confidential messages only happens when there is no
eavesdropper inside the secrecy guard zone. As we are concerned with decentralized networks, it is
assumed that each transmitter individually decides whether or not to transmit based on the existence
of eavesdroppers inside its own guard zone.
The general idea of guard zone is not new and has been applied in wireless ad hoc networks
without or with security considerations: In [30], the authors used a guard zone around each receiver
such that the receiver is active when there is no interferers inside the guard zone. The authors in [11]
and [16] studied the secure connectivity and secrecy capacity scaling law of ad hoc networks in the
presence of eavesdroppers, respectively, and applied a secrecy guard zone around each legitimate
node. In this work, we apply a secrecy guard zone around each legitimate transmitter and consider
the following two transmission protocols:
1) Non-Cooperative Transmitters: The transmitter remains silent when eavesdropper(s) are
found inside its secrecy guard zone.
2) Cooperative Transmitters: The transmitter produces artificial noise when eavesdropper(s) are
found inside its secrecy guard zone.
The idea of using artificial noise for secrecy was first proposed for multi-antenna transmissions
in [31], which is also related to the idea of cooperative jamming studied in [6, 9, 18, 32, 33]. An
example of a network snapshot with secrecy guard zones is shown in Fig. 2. In the following, we
study the secrecy transmission capacity with each transmission protocol.
A. Secrecy Guard Zone with Non-Cooperative Transmitters
The set of actual transmitter locations, denoted as Φl′ , has density of
λ′l = λl exp[−piλeD2], (29)
where the exponential term in (29) is the probability of no eavesdropper located inside the secrecy
guard zone of an arbitrary transmitter. With the secrecy guard zone, the distribution of the actual
transmitters does not still follow a homogeneous PPP. The non-homogeneous nature resulted from the
introduction of guard zone was discussed in [30]. In particular, the authors in [30] applied standard
Poisson tests to show that the distribution of the actual transmitters can still be well-approximated
by a homogeneous PPP outside B(b,D) from the viewpoint of a receiver at location b, where the
notation B(b,D) stands for a disk of radius D centered at b. Based on this result, we apply the
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following two approximations: From the viewpoint of eavesdropper e, the actual transmitter Φl′
follows a homogeneous PPP with density λ′l outside B(e,D). From the viewpoint of any legitimate
receiver, the actual transmitter Φl′ follows a homogeneous PPP with density λ′l.
4
For the typical receiver, the connection outage5 probability is given by
Pco = 1− exp
[
−λ′lpir2β2/αt Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]
. (30)
With the connection outage constraint Pco = σ and βt = 2Rt − 1, the transmission rate Rt is found
as
Rt = log2
1 + [ ln 11−σ
λ′lpir2Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)]α2
 . (31)
From the viewpoint of the typical transmitter located at the origin o, the eavesdroppers Φe follows
a homogeneous PPP with density λe outside B(o,D). Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, an upper
bound on the secrecy outage probability is obtained by using the generating functional of Φe and
applying Jensen’s inequality as
PUBso = 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
R2\B(o,D)
P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl′ Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
)
de
]
= 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
R2\B(o,D)
EZ
{
exp[−βe|Xe|αZ]
}
de
]
= 1− exp
[
−2piλe
∫ ∞
D
LZ(βerαe )redre
]
, (32)
where Z =
∑
l∈Φl′ Sle|Xle|−α is the sum of interference power at eavesdropper e and LZ(·) denotes
the Laplace transform of Z. Note that we have assumed that Φl′ is a homogeneous PPP outside
B(e,D) from the viewpoint of eavesdropper e. Hence, LZ(·) is given by [26]
LZ(x) = exp
[
piλ′l
(
D2ES
{
1− exp[−xSD−α]
}
− x2/αES
{
S2/α
}
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
+x2/αES
{
S2/αΓ
(
1− 2
α
, xSD−α
)})]
, (33)
4Note that the second approximation usually underestimates the interference power at the typical receiver, since the potential
interferers near the typical (active) transmitter is more likely to be active than the ones far away from the typical transmitter.
However, this underestimation is marginal as long as λ′l is reasonably close to λl, such as the scenarios to be considered in Fig. 5.
5The connection outage event is defined as the transmitted message being undecodable at the intended receiver. Hence, it does
not include the event of no transmission due to the existence of eavesdropper(s) inside the guard zone. A similar note applies to the
secrecy outage event. The effect of transmission probability on the secrecy transmission capacity is incorporated in λ′l.
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where S is an exponentially distributed random variable with unit mean and Γ(·, ·) is the upper
incomplete Gamma function. Using integral identities from [34] to evaluate the expectations in (33),
we have
LZ(x) = exp
[
piλ′l
(
xD2−α
1 + xD−α
− x2/αΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
+
xD2−α
(1− 2
α
)(1 + xD−α)2 2
F1
(
1, 2; 2 +
2
α
;
1
1 + xD−α
))]
, (34)
where 2F1(·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function.
Substituting (34) into (32), PUBso is expressed in an integral form, hence, Re can be solved
numerically with the secrecy outage constraint PUBso =  and βe = 2
Re − 1. A lower bound on
the secrecy transmission capacity is found as
τLB(r) = (Rt −Re)(1− σ)λ′l. (35)
B. Secrecy Guard Zone with Cooperative Transmitters
In this scenario, the legitimate transmitters cooperative with each other. When eavesdropper(s)
are found inside the secrecy guard zone, the transmitter produces artificial noise to help masking
the confidential message transmissions from others. The artificial noise is assumed to be statistically
identical to the confidential messages and hence, it cannot be distinguished from message trans-
missions by the eavesdroppers. It is noted that this cooperative protocol is entirely distributive as it
does not require any coordination between the legitimate transmitters.
For any legitimate receiver or eavesdropper, the set of interferers is still Φl with density λl. On
the other hand, the set of actual transmitters is Φl′ with density λ′l given by
λ′l = λl exp[−piλeD2]. (36)
Since the interferers remain the same as if no secrecy guard zone is applied, the connection outage
probability Pco and the transmission rate Rt are still given by (7) and (8), respectively.
From the viewpoint of the typical transmitter located at the origin o, the eavesdroppers Φe follows
a homogeneous PPP with density λe outside B(o,D). Again, an upper bound on the secrecy outage
probability is found using the generating functional of Φe and applying Jensen’s inequality as
PUBso = 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
R2\B(o,D)
P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
)
de
]
= 1− exp
−λe exp
[
− λlpiβ2/αe Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
D2
]
λlβ
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)
 . (37)
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With the secrecy outage constraint of PUBso = , we find Re as
Re = log2
1 +
 W0
(
λepiD
2
[
ln 1
1−
]−1)
λlpiD2Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2
α
)

α
2
 . (38)
Theorem 2: A lower bound on the secrecy transmission capacity for networks having cooperative
transmitters with secrecy guard zones is given by
τLB(r) = (Rt −Re)(1− σ)λ′l
= (1− σ)λl exp[−piλeD2] log2
 1 +
[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α )
]α
2
1 +
[
W0(λepiD2[ln 11− ]−1)
λlpiD2Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α )
]α
2
 . (39)
From the closed-form expression of τLB(r) in (39), we can derive the condition for positive
secrecy transmission capacity by solving τLB(r) > 0.
Corollary 2: The condition for positive secrecy transmission capacity is given by[ 1
1− σ
](D
r
)2
ln
1
1− σ ln
1
1−  > pir
2λe. (40)
When the system designer has control over the connection outage constraint and the guard zone
size, positive secrecy transmission capacity can be achieved by carefully choosing the values of σ
and/or D to meet the condition in (40). Similar to the networks without guard zones, the density of
the legitimate transmitters has no say for the existence of positive secrecy transmission capacity for
fixed connection outage probability and guard zone size. Comparing (21) with (40), we see that the
improvement from having the secrecy guard zone is given by the factor of [ 1
1−σ ]
(D/r)2 . For a fixed
r, the minimum required value of D increases as σ or  decreases (below certain threshold value).
Hence, one may also expect that the optimal value of D, which maximizes the secrecy transmission
capacity in (39), increases as σ or  decreases.
To further improve the network throughput, the secrecy guard zone could in the future be used in
combination with other types of guard zone, such as carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) at the
transmitters [35] and the interference guard zone at the receivers [30].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present numerical results on the secrecy transmission capacity. We first show
the interplay of different system parameters and their effects on the secrecy transmission capacity
for networks without secrecy guard zones. Fig. 3 shows the secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r)
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in (20) versus the spatial transmission intensity λl with different security requirements. Comparing
between the four curves, we see that the gap in τLB(r) between  = 1 and  = 0.05 is relatively small
over a wide range of λl. This suggests that the throughput cost of achieving a moderate security
requirement is relatively low. On the other hand, τLB(r) drops dramatically as  decreases towards
0. For example, there is a 84% reduction in τLB(r) for improving the security level from  = 0.02
to  = 0.01 at λl = 0.01. This reflects a significant increase in the throughput cost of achieving
highly secure networks.
For each curve in Fig. 3, we see that the optimal value of λl is generally much larger than λe.
This suggests that it is desirable to have a significantly larger number of legitimate nodes than
the number of eavesdroppers in the network, which creates a high level of interference to mask
the confidential message transmissions against eavesdropping. Furthermore, the optimal value of λl
increases as  decreases. For example, the optimal λl is 0.04 for  = 0.05, while it increases to
0.051 for  = 0.02 and to 0.068 for  = 0.01. Note that the optimal value of λl computed from (24)
is 0.063 for  = 0.01, which is very close to the numerical result.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) in (20) versus the connection outage proba-
bility σ with different security requirements. The feasible range of σ for positive secrecy transmission
capacity never reaches 0, which agrees with the result in (22). We see that a moderate connection
outage probability is desirable for achieving high secrecy transmission capacity. Furthermore, the
optimal value of σ increases as  reduces. This is because that a larger Re is needed for a stronger
security requirement, in which case larger Rt and (hence) σ are desirable for maximizing the secrecy
transmission capacity. For example, the optimal σ is 0.4 for  = 0.05 while it increases to 0.5 for
 = 0.02 and to 0.6 for  = 0.01. Note that the optimal value of σ can be accurately computed from
the closed-form expression in (28) for sparse networks.
Now, we present the results on the use of a guard zone for improving the secrecy transmission
capacity. Fig. 5 shows τLB(r) in (35) and (39) versus the secrecy outage probability  for both the
non-cooperative and cooperative protocols.6 This figure clearly shows the remarkable benefit of guard
zone for networks with high security requirements. For example, the secrecy transmission capacity at
 = 0.01 increases from 0.003 at D = 0 (i.e., no guard zone) to 0.018 with non-cooperative protocol
and 0.021 with cooperative protocol at D = 3. On the other hand, the benefit of guard zone reduces
6Although we have chosen r = 1 in Fig. 5, the benefit of using a secrecy guard zone demonstrated in Fig. 5 is also observed for
other values of r which can be either less than or greater than D (plots omitted for brevity).
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as the security requirement reduces. We also see that the cooperative protocol outperforms the non-
cooperative protocol and the difference in secrecy transmission capacity is significant for networks
with high security requirement. For example, the increase in τLB(r) from the non-cooperative case
to the cooperative case at  = 0.01 is 17% when D = 3 and 14% when D = 6.
The feasible regions of the connection outage probability σ and the secrecy outage probability  for
positive secrecy transmission capacity are illustrated in Fig. 6. The case of cooperative transmitters
is considered when the guard zone is used. In general, it is impossible to have arbitrarily low outage
probabilities while still operating at some positive secrecy transmission capacity. Nevertheless, the
use of a guard zone greatly enlarges the feasible ranges of both outage probabilities.
Fig. 7 shows the optimal guard zone radius for cooperative transmitters. We see that the optimal
value of D reduces as the acceptable secrecy outage probability  increases and it reaches zero at
moderate to high values of . We can also see the dependence of the optimal D on σ and λl. The
general trend is that the optimal D reduces as σ or λl increases. The dependence of the optimal
D on σ agrees with our earlier observation from (40). The dependence on λl can be understood as
follows: As the interference level (i.e.,λl) increases, the signal power received at the eavesdroppers
is allowed to be higher for maintaining the same SIR. This in turn allows us to reduce the guard
zone radius, which increases the spatial intensity of message transmissions. In practice, a legitimate
transmitter may only be able to detect the existence of eavesdroppers in its vicinity, hence, the
guard zone is usually small. Nevertheless, we have seen from Fig. 5 that a significant improvement
in the secrecy transmission capacity can be achieved even with a small guard zone. Furthermore,
by allowing a moderate connection outage probability, it is possible for the network to operate with
the optimal guard zone radius which is within the maximum detection range of the transmitters.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we defined a performance metric named the secrecy transmission capacity, which
was used to study the impact of physical layer security requirements on the throughput of large-
scale decentralized wireless networks. Using tools and existing results from stochastic geometry,
the secrecy transmission capacity can usually be characterized in simple analytical forms, as shown
in this paper for Rayleigh fading channels. One important finding is that the throughput cost of
achieving a moderate security level is relatively low, while it becomes very expensive to realize
a highly secure network. In addition, we showed that the application of secrecy guard zone with
artificial noise is a simple technique that can be used to dramatically reduce the throughput cost of
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achieving highly secure networks.
This model of secrecy transmission capacity can be extended to analyze and design networks
with other transmission techniques, medium access control protocols, and eavesdropping strategies
in future work. Similar to other transmission capacity formulations, the main limitation of this model
is that it only considers single-hop transmissions, while the communication between an arbitrary
source-destination pair usually requires multiple hops. End-to-end throughput analysis of wireless
networks with physical layer security requirements is still an open problem. Another limitation of
the current model is the homogeneous Poisson distribution of nodes. The impact of eavesdropper
distribution on secrecy throughput is an interesting problem to investigate.
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TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATION
Φl Poisson point process (PPP) of legitimate transmitter locations
Φe PPP of eavesdropper locations
λl Density of Φl
λe Density of Φe
Rt Rate of the transmitted codewords
Rs Rate of the confidential messages
Re Rt −Rs, rate loss for securing the messages against eavesdropping
Pco Connection outage probability
Pso Secrecy outage probability
σ Constraint on Pco
 Constraint on Pso
τ(r) Secrecy transmission capacity with transmission distance r
βt Threshold signal to interference ratio (SIR) for connection outage
βe Threshold SIR for secrecy outage
S Rayleigh fading gain of the wireless channel
D Radius of secrecy guard zones
P(.) Probability operator
E{.} Expectation operator
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. An example of a part of a network snapshot. Each legitimate transmitter, Ti, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, has an intended receiver
Ri, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, located at a distance r. In addition, there are eavesdroppers, Ei, i = 1, 2, presented in the network. Consider the
confidential message transmission from T0. The intended receiver R0 as well as each eavesdropper Ei, i = 1, 2 all try to individually
decode the transmitted message. The signal reception at R0 and (an arbitrary eavesdropper) E1 are shown in figures (a) and (b),
respectively. In both cases, the concurrent transmissions from T1, T2 and T3 act as interference.
23
Fig. 2. An example of a part of a network snapshot with a secrecy guard zone around each transmitter. Transmitters T0, T1,
and T2 do not find any eavesdropper inside their individual guard zone, and hence, transmit confidential messages to their intended
receivers. However, transmitter T3 detects an eavesdropper, E2, insides its guard zone. If the non-cooperative protocol is used, T3
remains silent. If the cooperative protocol is used, T3 transmits artificial noise.
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Fig. 3. The secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) in (20) versus the density of legitimate transmitters λl. Results are shown for
networks with different secrecy outage constraints, i.e.,  = 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, as well as no secrecy constraint, i.e.,  = 1. The other
system parameters are r = 1, α = 4, σ = 0.3, and λe = 0.001.
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Fig. 4. The secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) in (20) versus the connection outage probability σ. Results are shown for networks
with different secrecy outage constraints, i.e.,  = 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, as well as no secrecy constraint, i.e.,  = 1. The other system
parameters are r = 1, α = 4, λl = 0.01, and λe = 0.001.
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Fig. 5. The secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) with guard zone in (35) and (39) versus the secrecy outage probability . Results
are shown for networks with different guard zone radii, i.e.,D = 0, 3, 6. The other system parameters are r = 1, α = 4, σ = 0.3,
λl = 0.01, and λe = 0.001.
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Fig. 6. The region of positive secrecy transmission capacity with and without secrecy guard zone. The case of cooperative transmitters
is shown with different guard zone radii, i.e.,D = 0, 3, 6. The curves are plotted based on the relationship between the connection
outage probability σ and the secrecy outage probability  given in (40). The other system parameters are r = 1 and λe = 0.001.
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Fig. 7. The optimal secrecy guard zone radius versus the secrecy outage probability  for the case of cooperative transmitters.
Results are shown for networks with different connection outage constraints, i.e.,σ = 0.1, 0.3, and different densities of legitimate
transmitters, i.e.,λl = 0.01, 0.05. The other system parameters are r = 1, α = 4, and λe = 0.001.
